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The Taming of the News:
How Mass Media Affect U.S. Foreign Policy
by Dave Campbell
There is an old axiom among members of
the media: All local news is news and all foreign
news is foreign. While obviously overstated, this
saying neatly summarizes the long-standing perception about how the American public views
foreign news. Conventional wisdom has held
that owing to this seeming indifference, policy
makers (particularly the executive branch) were
free to formulate foreign policy without much
input from public opinion. They needed only to
keep policy within the very broad parameters
deemed acceptable by the American public
(Kelleher 1994, 235).
The question to be considered in this paper is whether the ubiquity of mass media with
heavy foreign news coverage like the Cable News
Network (CNN), has changed how u.s. foreign
policy is made. In answering the question, the
utility of a model developed by O'Heffernan
(1991) will be evaluated. O'Heffernan's model
appears useful because it takes into account two
aspects of television's possible effect on foreign
policy:
• the concept labeled "pictures driving policy"
(Siegel 1993, 13). This phenomenon allegedly
results from graphic scenes like those from
Bosnia or Somalia broadcast on television,
driving public opinion which then influences
the decisions made regarding U.s. action
abroad.
• the immediate information available through
real-time media like CNN to foreign policy
makers themselves.
In brief, O'Heffernan's model proposes
that (1) the media add new information, rapidly,
both to what the public and elite know about foreign policy issues, particularly crises; (2) the media give high profile to nongovernmental organizations and even individuals as they report on
foreign affairs; and (3) the media introduce a
broader range of goals and criteria than previously considered when making foreign policy
decisions (1991, 91). Following O'Heffernan's
lead, for the purposes of this paper mass media
will be defined as both newspapers and television.

To evaluate this model two case studies
will be compared--the 1965 U.s. invasion of the
Dominican Republic and the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti.

Exposition
Before gauging the utility of O'Heffernan's model, it is necessary to review first the
longstanding norms of academic opinion regarding the media's influence on the foreign policy process and then what seem to be recent
changes in this opinion.
The landmark work on this subject is
generally considered to be Bernard Cohen's 1963
book The Press and Foreign Policy (Taylor 1994). In
his book Cohen paints a picture of an almost
symbiotic relationship between key newspaper
journalists and chief foreign policy makers. As
Cohen saw it, prominent columnists and reporters could influence policy as "actors in the process, trying to influence the opinions of both the
public and the government official" (1963, 39).
Conversely, the media was also seen as an
"instrument of government" (28), publishing information fed to them by high-level contacts in
the State Department or White House.
The general public was viewed by journalists and policy makers as uninterested in the
workings of foreign policy. Following World War
Two foreign policy scholars like Cohen came to a
consensus, based on the writings of Gabriel Almond and Walter Lippmann, that the general
public knew little about foreign policy and policy
makers cared little about how the general public
felt regarding foreign affairs (Holsti 1992). Instead, scholars spoke of an "attentive public," a
small percentage of the electorate who pay attention to foreign news sources like the New York
Times, and offer opinions to those who formulate
American foreign policy. This attentive public in
turn influenced the opinions of the mass public,
in what is generally labeled the "two-step" model
of communication (Flanigan and Zingale 1994,
145).
With the rise of satellite-linked television
services, and the overwhelming pervasiveness of
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mass media outlets, these assumptions have begun to be re-evaluated.

With data like this in mind, many have
now called into question whether the AlmondLippmann view of a public largely unaware of
foreign news is still accurate (Holsti 1992). Due to
the ubiquity of television, the public may not
necessarily be more intrinsically interested in foreign affairs but may be more aware of it. While
her thoughts are by no means conventional wisdom among academics, Kelleher claims that:

It is clear that more and more Americans
rely on television images as their international frame; the widening availability of
CNN and other "instant reality" channels
suggests this trend will continue ....The
result may well be both oversimplification
and a higher average level of information
among attentive publics. There is clearly
also a far greater emotional impact on the
public as a whole. (Kelleher 1994,233)

Almost every general foreign policy survey shows the public is increasingly well
informed about global issues, devotes attention to evolving international events,
and has clear opinions on most major foreign and defense policy questions. (1994,
235)

What Kelleher calls the emotional impact of television news is what has received the most attention of late. From the live broadcasts of Peter
Arnett in Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War
to coverage this April of bombs falling on a
Sarajevo market, every strata of the American
public is able now to experience what goes on
across the sea like never before. Television is a
visual medium, and images can evoke powerful
responses:

In light of what appears to be a radical shift in the
salience of foreign news in America owing to the
mass media, a new model to explain the relationship between media coverage of foreign matters
and foreign policy decisions seems needed. In
reference to advances in the technology used by
the mass media, Snow and Brown have written:

More than print or radio, television news-especially as practiced with the more and
more vivid and dramatic techniques of the
1970s and 1980s--provoke[s] an intense
and often passionate reaction to foreign issues. (Beschloss 1994, 40)

In subtle ways that neither practitioners
nor theoreticians yet understand, these
advances are changing the international
affairs that are the substance of foreign
and defense policy, as well as the way
policy is made. (1994, 227)

Foreign news now receives more prominence in
both the print media and on television than ever
before, partly because twenty-four hour a day
media outlets like CNN have a lot of time to fill,
but also to a large extent because the technology
now exists to broadcast events from around the
globe as they happen. Newspapers too now have
the capability to "receive typeset copy and digitized photographs by satellite around the world,
enabling them to print same-day editions with
current news" (O'Heffernan 1991, 4). It seems that
more and more Americans are privy to foreign
policy news, available with little effort. In 1963
Cohen estimated that the average American
spent two and one third minutes reading foreign
news (251). At the time, only 29 percent of
Americans considered television a credible
source for international news (Beschloss 1994,
39). Times have changed. In 1980, 51 percent of
Americans found television news to be the most
credible source for news, while the network news
featured an average of ten minutes a night of foreign news (ibid. In 1989, 25.4 percent of the
American public reported watching CNN within
the last seven days (Stanley and Niemi 1992, 54).
This fact is particularly significant for this discussion because CNN "is deeply committed to international news coverage" (Beschloss 1994, 40).

Considering this perceived lack of understanding, let us turn to an analysis of a new theoretical
framework specifically developed in contradistinction to Cohen's conclusions, that of O'Heffernan.

Analysis
O'Heffernan's model is far too extensive
to deal with completely here. For the sake of
space, this paper will address only how the media provide input to the foreign policy process.
Areas left unexplored include how the government uses the media as an outlet to persuade the
public to support policy and how real-time television coverage (CNN especially) has changed
the once fairly closed and deliberative world of
diplomacy.
Media as a source of information
Perhaps the most apparent effect of the
mass media's foreign news coverage is the sheer
amount of information they make available. As
Cohen saw it, the media relied on government
sources exclusively for most of their foreign
news. While today's media certainly still rely on
information supplied by policy makers (apparent
2
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in the Persian Gulf War), they are also able to
shoot video, take pictures, and write stories at the
scene of a foreign story, crisis or otherwise. Only
with the technology available in the last few
years--satellite hook-ups, miniaturized television
cameras, etc.--has this been possible.
Turning to the comparison between the
Dominican Republic invasion in 1965 and the
Haiti intervention of 1994, we can see how technology has changed the manner in which the
media cover foreign stories. The comparison
between these two military invasions is particularly suited to this study for a number of reasons.
They both involve approximately the same number of U.S. troops, twenty thousand (Collins 1991,
155). Both nations share the island of Hispaniola,
and are therefore the same distance from U.S.
borders. While the circumstances surrounding
the two interventions are not identical, they both
involve an American force landing in a small
Caribbean nation to ensure the installation of a
government friendly to the U.S. In 1965 the U.S.
was worried that the Dominican Republic would
fall to Marxist revolutionaries; in 1994 the u.s.
was ostensibly worried about human rights violations by the Cedras regime. Beyond these broad
similarities, there is an important difference between these two invasions. In 1965, the technology needed to link continents with TV signals
bounced off of a satellite was only in its infancy.
Ironically, the first test of such a system occurred
five days after the u.s. troops landed in the Dominican Republic (Gould 1965, AI).
Without today's technology allowing for
real-time broadcasting, the media were forced, as
Cohen's model suggests, to rely upon the American Ambassador to the Dominican Republic for
information. In retrospect, the information provided was highly inaccurate; the crisis was terribly exaggerated.

an executive with NBC News, "This is the first
event of this kind where the news organizations
are not relying on the military for primary access.
If the invasion is in Port-au-Prince, we'll see all
there is to see" (Carter 1994, A8). There is little
doubt that President Clinton wanted to avoid the
broadcast of u.s. troops either getting shot or
shooting others, providing impetus for the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation to negotiate with
Haiti's ruling junta and avoid a bloody invasion.
The first aspect of such media saturation
is that the public knows more about the effects of
foreign policy decisions made, and perhaps most
significantly, can see more of those effects than at
any time in the past. Recent research has shown
that, contrary to Cohen's description of the limited effect public attitudes have on foreign policy
decisions, contemporary policy makers do heed
what they perceive public opinion to be. Having
conducted extensive interviews with officials
from both the State Department and the National
Security Council, Powlick concluded in 1991 that
there is "virtually a cultural norm within the foreign policy bureaucracy, that the best policy is
one which accounts for public opinion" (625).
Lloyd Cutler, White House counsel to both
Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, has repudiated
the Almond-Lippmann consensus (upon which
Cohen based his work) that the opinions of only
a select few in the electorate are considered when
foreign policy is made.
To sustain its foreign and national security policies, an administration must not
merely satisfy the minority of print readers who care about such issues, it must
now satisfy the entire national television
audience as well. This is especially true of
policies that place U.S. forces at risk. (1984,
114)

More recently, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake has admitted that engagement of U.S.
troops does depend on public pressure (Hoge
1994, 138-39).
Thus far, I have attempted to demonstrate that blanket media coverage of foreign
news has affected mass U.s. public opinion,
which is then taken into consideration by policy
makers. Another implication of the constant barrage of new information provided by the mass
media is that foreign policy makers themselves
are often directly affected by what they see. In a
questionnaire administered to top policy makers
in the Reagan administration, 83 percent said that
"they knew first or second hand of a case where

When the correspondents were finally
allowed to visit the cities and countryside,
they discovered that none of the norror
stories that they had reported were true.
Instead of the 1,000 and 1,500 bodies
which, according to President Johnson,
had made the intervention imperative,
there were fewer than a dozen. (Graber
1984,324)

Contrast this with Haiti. There the networks had
set up broadcast equipment days before the U.s.
troops landed. As one example, CNN had four
locations in the tiny country from which it could
transmit video. In the words of David Bohrman,
3
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mined if such a "change hypothesis" is accurate
(1991, 637). This question requires further research along the lines of the following discussion.
Earlier I noted that some academics have
predicted that with the amount of foreign news
available, Americans have overcome their notorious ignorance regarding overseas matters.
While Kelleher (1994, 235) is confident of such an
assertion and Snow and Brown (1994, 231) hypotheSize that this is so, the evidence to date is
hardly conclusive. In a comprehensive study of
U.S. public opinion from the 1930s to the 1980s,
Page and Shapiro (1992) concluded that there has
been no noticeable increase in public attentiveness to foreign policy matters. Wittkopf (1990)
conducted a similar analysis of public opinion
data over thirteen years and likewise has noted
no upswing in the percentage of the American
electorate attentive to foreign affairs.
Anecdotally, however, a comparison
between survey responses about Haiti in 1994
and the Dominican Republic in 1965 does lend
credence to the assertion that Americans are
more likely to have cogent opinions about foreign policy. When Gallup asked Americans in
May of 1965 (a few weeks after u.s. troops
landed in the Dominican Republic) whether they
thought the troops were likely to stay there for a
year or two, 32 percent said they had no opinion
(Gallup 1972, 1943). But in 1994, a Time / CNN poll
found only 7 percent of Americans were not sure
when asked how long they thought U.S. troops
would stay in Haiti (T i me, CNN, and
Yankelovich Partners 1994). Why would 25 percent more of the public have a fairly substantive
opinion (beyond merely supporting or opposing
the troops' presence) about Haiti than the Dominican Republic? A likely reason is the media's
far more extensive coverage of one than the
other.
While I was not able to compare television coverage thirty years apart, an analysis of
New York Times coverage does show the much
higher profile Haiti has had recently than that of
the Dominican Republic in 1965. There is a likely
link, however, between what the elite print media and television news cover. Robinson and
Sheehan hypothesize that there is a "new" two
step model of communication--"from the New
York Times to Dan Rather [and television news
outlets generally] to the public" (in O'Heffernan
1991,62). In looking at the International section of
the Times from the day u.s. troops landed and
then six days after for both invasions, a greater

TV directly impacted policy by providing information that either contradicted official information or provided a visual element so powerful it
affected policy officials who saw it" (O'Heffernan
1991, 73). Of that 83 percent, most commented
that what they saw was broadcast on the network
news or CNN.
With both policy makers and the public
being saturated with so much information,
O'Heffernan has identified a "fast-forward effect."
No longer can policy makers have a time frame
like the six days President Kennedy had during
the Cuban Missile Crisis to mull decisions over.
Instead, decisions must be made rapidly as new
information becomes available. In looking at the
Haiti intervention we have seen a textbook case
of this "high speed" policy making. Originally,
the troops sent to Haiti were under strict orders
not to become a police force. This led to the
spectacle on television of U.S. troops standing
idle while Haitian police brutally beat Haitian civilians. Predictably, after only a few days of such
pictures being beamed into America's homes, the
Clinton administration quickly changed the policy. The troops were instructed to halt such
atrocities. Referring to coverage of U.S. soldiers
being unable to stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence,
one White House aide said "four or five nights of
it on television would have undone us politically" (Jehl 1994, AI). Note that the decision to
change the policy was made after U.S. forces had
been in Haiti for only a few days. In the Dominican Republic incident, the decision to send troops
was based on what is now generally considered
to be bogus information. The media were not
able to verify what they were being told by government officials for over a week (Graber 1984,
323). Unlike Haiti, there was no media presence
to force the Johnson administration to reconsider
its policy quickly.
To this point, O'Heffernan's description
of the effect of the rapid information provided by
the media on foreign policy matters seems to be
accurate. However, while O'Heffernan has dealt
with whether foreign policy makers consider
public opinion, he has skirted the question of
whether the public is more knowledgeable now
than they have been in the past about foreign affairs. Because he has explicitly stated that this
work is designed to update that of Cohen, and
Cohen based his work on the assumption of an
uniformed public, this seems to be a glaring
omission. Pow lick, whose work is very similar to
O'Heffernan's, admits that no one has yet deter4
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pervasiveness is apparent for Haiti than the Dominican Republic. In 1965, the New York Times
ran forty stories about the Dominican Republic in
that time period, none having a full banner
headline. By way of contrast, in 1994 the Times
ran fifty-four stories about Haiti during the first
week of the troops' presence there. More significantly, four consecutive days saw Haiti take a full
banner headline across the top of the front page.
Indeed, on the twentieth of September stories
about Haiti filled five full pages in the Times. Mter only a few days, the Times began running a
regular Haiti section of one to four pages of stories, diagrams, and pictures entitled "Mission in
Haiti." The Dominican Republic invasion received no such treatment.
Even taking into account Viet Nam as a
rival story in 1965, at least one media outlet, and
one of the leading ones at that, gave far greater
prominence to the 1994 events in Haiti than those
in the Dominican Republic twenty-nine years
ago.
I mention this disparity in media treatment of the Dominican Republic case compared
to the Haiti example because of the conventional
wisdom among some scholars that while the media do not tell people what to think, they are able
to influence what people think about (Fry, Taylor, and Wood 1994, 119). As Entman has pointed
out, these two effects may not be as mutually exclusive as has been generally assumed. "[T]he
media make a significant contribution to what
people think--to their political preferences and
evaluations--precisely by affecting what they
think about" (1989,347). Public opinion appears
to grow out of an interaction between media
messages and what audiences make of them.
When the messages the media present are framed
exclusively by government sources, the public is
inclined to support the administration's decisions. No better example exists of this phenomenon (which could perhaps be labeled the "limited
information effect") than the 1975 Mayaguez incident.

In Haiti, the American public could see what was
happening there first-hand and hear commentators compare it to the recent u.s. troop engagement in Somalia (another event covered extensively by the media). In the Dominican Republic,
there was very limited television coverage, and
relatively restricted newspaper coverage. All of
this may help explain why 76 percent of Americans supported President Johnson sending troops
into the Dominican Republic (Gallup 1972, 1942),
but of a more jaded 1994 public, only 43 percent
supported an invasion of Haiti (Gallup / CNN /
U.S.A. Today 1994).
New actors
In his model, O'Heffernan goes further
than simply point out that the media provide a
lot of information rapidly in the course of a foreign policy event. He also notes that the media
provide visibility for nongovernmental actors
and players with a narrow interest in various facets of foreign policy.
Insiders perceive that the strength of these
groups comes from their ability to publicize their issues widely through the mass
media, and to use the media to develop
the resources necessary to operate multIlaterally. The media coverage gives these
issues salience and occasionally becomes a
channel for political influence.
(O'Heffernan 1991, 93)

In the case study of Haiti, such a role has been
played by Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, a
group concerned with the immigration of refugees from mostly black nations. During April and
May of 1994, Robinson conducted a twenty-seven
day hunger strike to protest what he saw as unfair treatment of Haitians fleeing the Cedras regime. Robinson's fast certainly had the media's
attention. And remembering Entman's observation, if the media are influencing what people
think about, they are affecting what they think.
Over the twenty-seven days of his hunger strike,
a search on a computer database (Lexis/Nexis)
found that CNN ran fifty-six stories featuring
Randall Robinson. During and following the
hunger strike, Robinson and other Haitian advocates became regular features on CNN talk shows
whenever the topic of Haiti was to be dealt with.
The rise of prominent individuals and
special interest groups as influencing factors in
foreign policy matters is a relatively new phenomenon. In the contemporary policy making
process "policy officials perceive that these or-

Throughout the crisis, [President Gerald]
Ford was able to frame issues in his own
way and present information in a fashion
that supported his actions. Most Americans considered the liberation of the Mayaguez crew a triumph for the President,
despite the fact that roughly twice as
many Americans were killed in the venture as those rescued. (Beschloss 1994, 46)

5
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ganizations are effective in placing global issues
on the foreign policy agenda and maintaining
their salience" (O'Heffernan 1991, 93). It was reported in May that President Clinton was very
aware of the opposition to his Haiti policy resulting from Randall Robinson's hospitalization
(Fenyevsi 1994, 24).
Note that the coverage of Robinson's fast
also matches the two previously discussed aspects of the media's information barrage. Both
the general public and elite policy makers saw
the same news broadcasts.
At the time of the Dominican Republic
invasion, there was no equivalent advocate
and / or special interest group pushing Dominican Republic issues onto the agenda of either the
public or decision-making elites. This is hardly
surprising. While newspapers were able to give
coverage of such actors in print, television had
not yet developed the inclination to provide the
regular video images necessary to mobilize mass
opposition to government policy. Many observers posit that not until the Viet Nam War's Tet
Offensive in 1968 was there an "end of media
trust in the government's conduct of defense and
foreign policy" (Snow and Brown 1994, 224).

about Haitian refugees. Comparatively, the Dominican Republic intervention was cast simply as
a battle to thwart the spread of communism, to
prevent another Cuba (Wiarda and Kryzanek
1982, 127). The media presented no domestic angle to compare to the connections made in the
Haitian case to Haitian refugees and wealthy expatriates.
By way of analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this broader range of goals and
criteria showcased by the media is a cause or an
effect of the trend toward "intermestic" politics.
At the time of the Dominican Republic intervention, foreign policy was viewed through Cold
War glasses by both policy makers and the media. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. foreign policy
formulation has been made far more difficult
now that there is no longer a zero-sum competition for influence between the Americans and
Soviets. With this complexity, many issues, like
Haiti, are viewed as both international and domestic. Whether the media has facilitated this
mixing of once separate policy spheres, as O'Heffernan asserts, or instead only reported on what
would have happened even without their coverage is difficult to say. Further research is needed
to strengthen this element of O'Heffernan's
model.

Broader range of goals and criteria
The third element of O'Heffernan's
model is the ability the media now have to
"broaden the range of goals and criteria used for
policy by interconnecting causes and effects that
normally operate outside agency purview or perceptions" (1991, 91). In other words. the media
can take an issue like overseas military intervention, which thirty years ago would have been
perceived strictly as a foreign policy matter, and
make a connection to domestic issues. This interconnection is why Randall Robinson's concerns
about Haitian refugees reaching U.S. shores are
relevant to a discussion about U.S. military involvement in Haiti. The refugees represent the
domestic side to a foreign issue. Indeed, in laying
out this facet of his model, O'Heffernan comments that "military and diplomatic policies in
Central America may create refugees in Texas
and California" (ibid.). Substitute "Haiti" for
"Central America" and "Florida" for "Texas and
California" and we have an almost prophetic description of a key factor in the decision to intervene in Haiti.
Clearly the refugee issue has had salience. A survey of CNN transcripts from January
1, 1994 to November 1, 1994 found 274 stories

Prescription
O'Heffernan's model, developed to update Cohen's work of over thirty years ago,
seems to be a useful analytical tool. However,
more work is needed to refine it. Specifically,
future research should be directed at determining
whether or not media pervasiveness has made
the American public more aware now of foreign
issues than in the past. Meta-analyses of cumulative public opinion polls, along the lines of the
work by Wittkopf (1990), seem to be a good place
to start. Similarly, while O'Heffernan's model incorporates the interconnection between foreign
and domestic issues, the jury is still out on
whether the media coverage of such is a cause or
an effect.
Including public opinion in a discussion
of foreign policy frightens many analysts. Since
the days of the Founding, mass public opinion
has been feared as irrational, especially in the
sphere of foreign policy. However, this fear is unfounded. As Page and Shapiro (1992) have concluded, the American public has demonstrated
an historical rationality about policy issues, not
the capriciousness and volatility it is often as6
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sumed to have. This is true even in an age with
ever increasing foreign news coverage. If anything, television's fast-forward effect can simply
speed up policy makers' accounting for the
opinions of those who ultimately employ them-the general public. In the words of Lloyd Cutler:

media will create one, often to the detriment of
sound policy. Take Bosnia for example. When
CNN broadcast pictures this April of a bombed
out market in Sarajevo, policy makers felt forced
to respond by ordering NATO airstrikes. But the
pressure to respond, driven by CNN's pictures,
was only felt because the Clinton administration
had a weak policy on the Balkan War. In Somalia
we had a similar situation--TV pictures prompted
George Bush to send U.S. troops in, and TV pictures spurred Bill Clinton to pull them out.
World politics abhors a policy vacuum. In the absence of real leadership on an issue, the media,
not policy makers ultimately accountable to the
electorate, will influence what the public thinks
about, and therefore what they think.
Thus, if the current administration
wishes to staunch the threat of having CNN's
pictures drive policy, it must act now to formulate policy that can be explained to the American
public. In Korea, where I believe the United
States runs a higher risk of war than the Clinton
White House admits publicly, sound policy must
be developed and communicated to the public.
The same must happen in Bosnia. Ted Koppel,
the man pundits have called TV's Secretary of
State (Snow and Brown 1994, 229), has put it this
way:

TV news can provide a useful early
warning that a policy course that costs
American lives or jobs will be very difficult to sustain over an extended period. It
can force an administration to calculate
fully the costs and benefits of such a policy
before it casts the die. (1984, 118)

Sadly, in interviewing State Department and
NSC staffers, Powlick (1991) has found that while
most acknowledge the need for public approval
of their policies, most also resent the role it plays.
Such elitism is not only undemocratic, but misguided. While I admit that the average American
may not know many of the niceties, nuances, and
details of foreign policy matters, the average
American does seem to be skeptical of the need
to risk the deaths of U.s. soldiers when the nation's vital interests are not at stake. That hardly
seems to be irrational. In fact, had the public been
made more aware of the real situation in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, objections likely
would have been raised, U.S. troops would not
have invaded, and U.S. relations would not have
been damaged throughout the Caribbean and
Latin America (Collins 1991, 156). In 1994, if the
threat that the mass media would cover an invasion of Haiti kept President Clinton looking for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict, then perhaps
the fourth estate has filled the role it was meant
to play.
This is not to say, however, that all is
well in Washington. As Lee Hamilton, Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has
commented:

To the degree ... that u.s. foreign policy
in a given region has been clearly stated
and adequate, accurate information has
been provided, the influence of television
coverage diminishe[s] proportionately.
(U.s. Congress 1994, 5)

In closing, it should be noted that the
media have long affected u.s. foreign policy. A
century ago, William Randolph Hearst's muckrakers helped foment u.s. public opinion in favor
of the Spanish American War. The difference today comes in the speed in which the media report, the visceral impact of the visual images they
broadcast, and the very pervasiveness of media
outlets. Whether it is CNN at the barbershop or
the New York Times at the bus stop, the media are
everywhere. The model outlined here offers
promise in making sense of how the new technology of the mass media has affected foreign
policy. However, the opportunity presents itself
for this and subsequent administrations to ensure
that pictures do not drive policy. The media need
not set America's foreign policy agenda. If the
administration has already set and communicated one, they need only report on it.

Television ... encourages policy makers
to react quickly, perhaps too quickly, to a
crisis .... Television, critics say, leads not
to sound policy, but to sound bites masDuerading as policy. (U.s. Congress 1994,

Hamilton is right. While it can provide opportunity for the public to see the effects of foreign
policy decisions in all their graphic detail, the
mass media (television especially) must not become the sole agenda setter in the sphere of the
international affairs of the United States. Instead,
policy makers themselves must have an agenda
on which the media can report. Otherwise the
7
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